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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE	
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4	UNITED STATES OF AMERIC.	A * * *
5	v.	* No. 1:19-cr-00251-LM-1
6		* 2:30 p.m.
7	JOHNATHON IRISH,	* *
8	* Defendant. *	
9	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *	
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11	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE	
12	BEFORE THE HONORABLE LANDYA B. McCAFFERTY	
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14	APPEARANCES:	
15	_	
16	For the government:	AUSA Anna Z. Kraskinski (Via telephone)
17		AUSA Kasey Weiland (Via telephone)
18		United States Attorney's Office
19	For the Defendant:	Benjamin L. Falkner, Esq.
20		(Via telephone) Krasnoo Klehm & Falkner LLP
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22		
23	<u>Court Reporter</u> :	Brenda K. Hancock, RMR, CRR Official Court Reporter
24		United States District Court 55 Pleasant Street
25		Concord, NH 03301 (603) 225-1454
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P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT: Good afternoon, Counsel. This is Judge McCafferty. The case name for the court reporter is <u>United</u>

<u>States of America versus Jonathan Irish</u>, Criminal Number

19-cr-251-LM.

Counsel, just go ahead and introduce yourselves for the court reporter.

MS. KRASINSKI: This is Anna Krasinski. Kase Weiland is also here.

MR. FALKNER: And this is Benjamin Faulkner on behalf of Mr. Irish.

THE COURT: All right. I just had some questions, some follow-up questions, after the hearing, and so I thought I would just get you on the phone rather quickly to resolve some of these questions that I have.

Let me start by just getting some clarity with respect to the issue of unanimity, jury unanimity. Now, the government originally indicated it wanted an instruction that the jury was not required to be unanimous with respect to each gun, that they could find one gun and that was sufficient. At the hearing today there seemed to be -- and I could be misremembering this, but it seems to me that the government was perhaps changing its position on that based on its desire that there be a finding so that, if he is convicted, he could be subject to the enhancement for three or more firearms.

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               Is that correct, Attorney Krasinski?
               MS. KRASINSKI: No, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Thank you. Why don't you clarify that,
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      then, for me and my clerks.
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               MS. KRASINSKI: I think we still believe the unanimity
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      instruction is appropriate. It may mean --
               THE COURT: When you say "unanimity instruction is
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      appropriate," do you mean the one that you've proposed that no
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      unanimity is required?
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               MS. KRASINSKI: Correct, your Honor. I think that's
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      what the case law supports.
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               THE COURT: And I agree with that. I think the
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      confusion may stem from you saying, "I want a unanimity
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      instruction." So, that may be where ultimately I got confused.
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      You're asking for an instruction that unanimity is not
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      required?
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               MS. KRASINSKI: Correct. Maybe I should call it a
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      lack-of-unanimity instruction.
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               THE COURT: Okay. And, Attorney Faulkner, do you
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      disagree with that?
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               MR. FALKNER: Do I -- I think it may be something that
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      I would like to address in my briefing, since we're briefing
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      anyway.
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               THE COURT: Well, I thought I had included that issue,
      but I think I included it simply because of my own confusion on
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the positions with respect to that instruction, and I'm not sure -- my understanding is that the government does not -- that a unanimity request is not necessary in this case because the guns were all found in the same box in the same place, they were seized from the same -- seized at the same time and in the same area.

MR. FALKNER: And, your Honor, I think -- and I'm not sure it's my position, and I think I do need to research it a bit more and potentially brief it. My concern is that in a lot of these lack of unanimity instruction cases the guns are all located together, but the guns are seized in the possession of the defendant as opposed to the guns in this case, which are never -- there may be some testimony that links them all together as being in this box and they're seized later together, but they're not seized directly from the possession of the defendant all together, and there is some testimony that separates the guns at various points in time or there is expected to be. So, for instance, there's expected to be some testimony from the witness Dylan Roosa that Mr. Irish was seen firing one of the weapons in the backyard, which would separate that weapon from the other two weapons, if the other two weapons were still in the box. So, the weapons are not necessarily always together in the same place, and I'm not sure what the government's going to be able to establish as to that.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, then, I'll leave that to you

in terms of your briefing, and perhaps that is essentially a factual question that ultimately I'll have to determine once we hear all the evidence in the case.

Can you shed some light on that, Attorney Krasinski?

MS. KRASINSKI: I anticipate there's going to be

testimony that during the time frame alleged in the indictment

that the defendant stored all three of these firearms in the

box, that he showed them in the box to at least one witness,

that he tended on occasion to carry the pistol either on his

person or take it out shooting, but that sort of as a general

matter he stored all three firearms together in this box in his

closet.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Now, let me ask also a question that I have lingering from our hearing this morning with respect to the nexus theory. My question is one of the three guns, one of the rifles, only one of the three guns has this interstate nexus issue, is my understanding, and it's because that one gun never traveled in interstate commerce nor did any portion of the gun. I'm sorry. One of the guns didn't travel in interstate commerce, but a portion of it, the receiver, may have.

MS. KRASINSKI: Correct, your Honor. The other two firearms we anticipate demonstrating nexus through the traditional way that it is established, that the firearm was shipped or transported in interstate commerce.

THE COURT: Okay. And so, with respect to the firearm at issue, there would be sort of three theories. One isn't available, that the firearm at issue traveled in interstate commerce. You don't have that theory available to you. Number two would be, based on the Ohio -- well, actually, not based on the Ohio case -- just based on case law, fairly established case law, that if part of the gun travels in interstate commerce there is a sufficient nexus. And then the third theory was the theory that you were articulating, Attorney Krasinski, about modifications made to the rifle could provide a nexus.

So, I just need clarity on the theory, the nexus theory that you intend to argue, and the reason I need to get clarity on this before I receive your briefing is I really want to have an understanding of what I'm going to be putting in jury instructions. Obviously, I will wait to get your briefing before I finalize those, and we'll obviously have our closing conferences on jury instructions, but I want to know what the government needs to prove before the case starts.

So, tell me, are you going to argue both of those nexus theories, Attorney Krasinski, or just one?

MS. KRASINSKI: So, I think our argument is going to be that his possession of the firearm was in or affecting commerce. I do not intend to argue that because a portion of it traveled in interstate commerce before the firearm was

manufactured that that is sufficient. I'm not going to argue that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. KRASINSKI: I do intend to argue that his possession of the firearm was in or affecting commerce both because he added aftermarket firearm accessories and had to buy aftermarket accessories that affected interstate commerce and sort of more broadly that possession and manufacture of firearms is an economic activity involving a pervasively regulated commodity, which, in the aggregate, affects interstate commerce.

THE COURT: We have looked at that fairly -- I mean, obviously, we've been looking into it since the hearing. That theory I'm going to need briefing on, which, obviously, I did ask you for. I'm a little concerned about that theory. But hold on one second.

(Pause)

studying that issue until we get to the trial on Monday and throughout.

MS. KRASINSKI: And, your Honor, if I can find first

-- I guess I'm just not aware of case law suggesting that if a

part was transported in interstate commerce that that is

sufficient. If I can find that case law and I'm comfortable

with that, I will intend to argue it.

THE COURT: Okay. I know that my clerks thought that there was case law supporting that, I think a Second Circuit decision involving a pipe bomb and part of a pipe bomb. A Fifth Circuit case.

So, in any event, I will, then -- I guess we'll keep the further briefing with respect to this nexus theory, and I would, if you do the research, Attorney Krasinski, and you come to the conclusion that you do want to argue this part of the firearm traveling is sufficient, if that part of the firearm has traveled in interstate commerce while the whole firearm has not, if you want to argue that, please include that in that further briefing.

MS. KRASINSKI: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So, we'll keep those two issues, then.

One other question that jumped out at me after the hearing, and I apologize that I noticed it after the hearing, now, at our conference that we had before jury selection the

government agreed to remove ammunition from consideration before the jury, so we have removed that from the jury instructions, any references to it. I notice, however, that the Exhibits 9a through 17, 19 through 26 and 27a through 27f are pieces of ammunition, and so I'm just wondering how we square that where that's not something that the jury is going to be considering.

MS. KRASINSKI: Although it's not charged, it is a part -- it's part and parcel to the investigation and the transfer, possession and discovery of everything here. So, the firearms were stored in a very large, black case, almost like a hard kind of Rubbermaid container, and all of those items were in the case with the firearms. There were additional items in there as well, a BB gun, a gas mask, a very large size -- I'm trying to think of the -- tactical vest. So, all of it was found together. Witnesses will testify that they saw all of it together, that where the defendant stored the firearms he also had all of these other items.

We believe it's res gestae, although I have to say, your Honor, we did, out of an abundance of caution, include it in our 404(b) notice that we submitted to defense. And so, it's just part of the conduct here. It's part of the course of events. I think it would be really difficult to separate out, which is why we did include it in our 404(b) notice and it is included as items of evidence here.

THE COURT: Okay. And, Attorney Faulkner, you don't object?

MR. FALKNER: If I could come up with a good basis to do so -- I mean, they're in the box, in the same box with the guns. He's not charged with them, and I don't think that -- you know, I think the more prejudicial aspect of all of this is the guns, and I'm not sure that I can argue the guns are unfairly prejudicial.

THE COURT: All right. That issue is resolved. All right. Because I note that the ID has been stricken from I think all of the ammunition. So, I just wanted to ask about that.

All right. Another question of a sort of similar nature is just going to help clarify for me how some of this evidence comes in. The original seizure of the firearms occurred in November of 2013, because I think that's the date of Government's Exhibit 1, which is the first stipulation -- no, I'm sorry. I think the first stipulation is 2015.

MS. KRASINSKI: The first stipulation is 2015. Yes, your Honor. The firearms were seized from the defendant, I believe, November 1st, 2013.

THE COURT: Right, right. The stipulation is dated 2015, but it has the date November 2013 in here as the date of the seizure, and so what I'm wondering is how does the jury square that? His guns are taken from him in November 2013, but

he's not a felon. So, how are you planning on explaining that to the jury, and is there an agreement between you and Attorney Faulkner? I just want to have that clarified for me.

MS. KRASINSKI: So, I did discuss this with Attorney Faulkner, and we discussed having the agents, you know, just say, "These are the firearms I seized from the defendant, and then they were in FBI's possession until 2015." You know, "On this particular day I met with the defendant. He signed this." And I guess we come up with a word other than "stipulation."

THE COURT: Agreement, maybe.

MS. KRASINSKI: Agreement saying that they were his firearms but directing that they be released to Roscoe Whitney and that they were released to Roscoe Whitney. So, what we discussed was sort of generally laying it out but not going into the details and really not discussing the criminal case, just that the FBI seized the firearms from the defendant, held onto them and then in 2015 released them to Roscoe Whitney at the defendant's direction.

THE COURT: Okav.

MR. FALKNER: Your Honor, if I may?

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. FALKNER: There's no indication that they were seized because of a criminal charge, and it may be helpful to just have an instruction at the time that anything is discussed

about this original seizure that the jury isn't to speculate as to why the FBI may have seized these weapons, something to that effect that doesn't suggest whether it is or is not criminal. I mean, I think it would be unfair, potentially, to suggest that it's not criminal, but that they are just simply not to even speculate as to whether it was criminal or not criminal whatsoever, just they were seized, and that's a fact, and they don't need to worry about why they were seized.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. And you agree with that, Attorney Krasinski, an instruction?

MS. KRASINSKI: I don't have a problem with it, your Honor. I could also elicit -- I mean, at the time they were seized he was not -- I'm fine with an instruction.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. If you both come up with some other way to handle this, that's fine. Let me know. It just struck me as something that was confusing to me. I don't understand. Why were they seized? Can you explain it to me, just so I'm prepared in case something inadvertently gets disclosed?

MS. KRASINSKI: It was seized in relation to the underlying investigation and his ultimate -- he was arrested and charged with aiding and abetting a straw purchase and lying to a federal agent, so it was seized in connection with his underlying felony conviction with that investigation.

THE COURT: All right. Well, gosh, that seems like --

1 so, the impression that I got -- of course, I know nothing about the case, and the jury is going to sit there and hear 2 this evidence, obviously, and wonder I think the same thing. 3 There's a seizure on November 2013, I think the convictions are 4 5 in 2014, and then there's this case. I think the jury is going to wonder what was involved in that first seizure, what 6 activity, what criminal activity potentially is going on there, 7 and so I wonder if there's a way -- because, obviously, it's 8 9 just sequential confusion, in essence, because the seizure 10 occurred before the convictions, but because they are related 11 I'm just wondering why you wouldn't tell the jury that. He's conceding he's a felon. He's conceding --12 13 MR. FALKNER: Your Honor, if I may? 14 THE COURT: Yeah. No, that doesn't -- go ahead. 15 MR. FALKNER: I'm concerned with telling -- with 16 sending a message to the jury that his convictions have anything to do with the seizure of these firearms --17 18 THE COURT: Right. 19 MR. FALKNER: -- because I think that's potentially 20 extraordinarily unfairly prejudicial.

THE COURT: Yeah. No, I agree. Because the convictions are false statements, right?

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MS. KRASINSKI: A false statement and, yes, aiding and abetting this false statement in connection with the purchase of a firearm. I don't have a problem if the way we want to

1 handle this is elicit that at the time they were seized his possession of them was lawful but at the time of release, 2 because we have got the stipulation, we've got the date of 3 4 conviction, he was a felon and so he couldn't have them back. 5 THE COURT: Yeah. 6 MS. KRASINSKI: If that's the way, I'm happy to do it 7 that way. THE COURT: Yeah. 8 9 MR. FALKNER: I think that would be great. 10 MS. KRASINSKI: I don't have a problem with that. 11 That's fine. 12 THE COURT: All right. Well, why don't you guys put 13 together a stipulation to that effect that could be introduced 14 at the same time the testimony is coming in. MS. KRASINSKI: Do you want us just to elicit that 15 16 through the agent? 17 THE COURT: That's fine. However the two of you want 18 to get that in, that's fine. If it's a stipulation, obviously, 19 we'll deal with it. If you just agree to elicit it, that's 20 fine, too. MS. KRASINSKI: Okay. 21 22 THE COURT: All right. I think that covers it. 23 I've thought further about the download from the phone, Quick Facts Felon in Possession of a Firearm, and I am going to grant 24

the motion to exclude that. I just think the evidence is only

1 minimally relevant on consciousness of quilt. It sounds as though the government has reams of evidence on consciousness of 2 guilt, people who are going to testify that Mr. Irish told them 3 4 various things and made admissions, and I think it has the 5 potential to confuse and mislead the jury and then potentially 6 cause the jury to speculate about the document in a manner 7 potentially prejudicial to the defendant. So, I am going to 8 grant Document Number 18. 9 I am going to issue a short order just summarizing the 10 hearing and the two issues that there's going to be further 11 briefing on, and I appreciate you being able to do this 12 telephone conference on short notice. 13 Is there anything else? 14 MR. FALKNER: No, thank you, your Honor. MS. KRASINSKI: No, thank you. 15

THE COURT: Thank you all for clarifying those things for me. I'll see you Monday. Court's adjourned.

(WHEREUPON, the proceedings adjourned at 2:58 p.m.)

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<u>CERTIFICATE</u>

I, Brenda K. Hancock, RMR, CRR and Official Court
Reporter of the United States District Court, do hereby certify
that the foregoing transcript constitutes, to the best of my
skill and ability, a true and accurate transcription of my
stenotype notes taken in the matter of <u>United States v.</u>
<u>Johnathon Irish, No. 19-cr-251-01-LM.</u>

Date: 3/27/20 /s/ Brenda K. Hancock
Brenda K. Hancock, RMR, CRR
Official Court Reporter